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The Waiver of Juvenile Court Jurisdiction
State v. Adams
69 Ohio State 2d 120, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982)
S INCE ILLINOIS CREATED the first juvenile court system by statute in 1899,1 every
state has enacted a juvenile justice system philosophically designed to help
rather than to punish children who violate the law.2 The juvenile court from
its inception has advocated the protection of misbehaving children from the
harsh retributive philosophy of the adult criminal law. Instead of punishment
it has attempted to provide methods by which to assist them to develop into
mature, responsible adults.3
Yet, from its inception, the proponents of the separate, specialized juvenile
justice system have presumed that some children would not respond positively
to its philosophy of treatment and rehabilitation.' This presumption is reflected
in the fact that all states but two have within their juvenile system a procedure
by which the juvenile court may waive its jurisdiction over such minors by
transferring them to the common pleas court to be tried and punished as adults.'
Historically, the juvenile system gave the juvenile judge great, if not sole
discretion, to determine whether such a child should be transferred. 6 The child
'Juvenile Court Act, ILL. LAWS, 1899.
'NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, LAW AND TACTICS IN JUVENILE CASES § 11.2 (1974).
'Gasper & Katkin, A Rationale for the Abolition of the Juvenile Court's Power to Waive Jurisdiction,
7 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 937, 938 (1980).
4Note, Waiver of Juvenile Jurisdiction and the Hard-Core Youth, 61 N.D. L. REV. 655, 656 n.6 (1975).
This article cites both Mack, The Juvenile Court 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 108-09 (1909), and Stamm, Transfer
of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Court: An Analysis of the Proceeding, Its Role in the Administration of Justice,
and a Proposal for the Reform of Kentucky Law, 62 Ky. L. J. 122, 146 (1973), for the proposition that
serious youthful offenders were considered beyond the therapeutic reach of the juvenile court.
'NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER, supra note 2, at § 11.2. In this article, the authors note: "This process
is referred to by many statutes as 'transfer of jurisdiction'. Others use the terms 'waiver' or 'declination
of jurisdiction,' 'dismissal of the juvenile court petition,' 'certification,' 'remand' or 'removal' of the
case to criminal court." New York and Vermont, the two states which do not provide for waiver of juvenile
court jurisdiction, place children older than fifteen years of age under the jurisdiction of the common
pleas court automatically. Id.
6Comment, Waiver of Jurisdiction in Juvenile Courts, 30 OHIO ST. L. J. 132 (1969):
The power of the state to step in and take the child in hand is justified by the doctrine of
parenspatriae.... Under the parens patriae doctrine, the state has the unquestioned right to deny
to the child many procedural rights available to adults. The rationale was that a child has a right
'not to liberty, but to custody'.
Comment, Juvenile Court and Direct Appeals from Waiver of Jurisdiction in Ohio, 8 AKRON L. REV.
499, 501 (1975):
This philosophy [parenspatriae], of course, resulted in an enormous amount of power being
centered in the juvenile courts, particularly in the individual juvenile judges. ...
[Vol. 16:2
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had no right to complain or object to his removal.7 However, in 1966, in Kent
v. United States, I the United States Supreme Court expressed its concern that
the broad authority permitted the juvenile court in waiver decisions resulted
too often in procedural arbitrariness.9
In Kent, therefore, the Supreme Court moved to curb the juvenile court's
substantial discretion. This was done by providing the child with due process
rights and protections which he could use to assert his interest in opposing his
transfer.'° The net effect of the Kent decision was to make the transfer of the
child to the adult court more difficult."
With the Kent decision, the Court decided the first of a line of cases that
would expand the rights of children in juvenile court proceedings.' 2 In an effort
to comply with the mandates set forth by the Supreme Court regarding the
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, the Ohio legislature enacted Ohio Revised
It is almost axiomatic that where great discretion exists, abuses of discretion, or at least major
inequities will also exist. The juvenile justice system is no exception.
'See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
'383 U.S. 541 (1966).
'Id. at 553.
"Id. at 557. The Supreme Court concluded by stating: "that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner
was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar
reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile
Court's decision." Id. The opinion set out eight basic criteria that can be used by the juvenile judge when
considering a waiver of jurisdiction. The following criteria were set out by the Court:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether the protection of the
community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilfull
manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given
to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prospective merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury
may be expected to return an indictment ...
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court where the juvenile's
associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime ...
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by consideration of his home,
environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile ...
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabili-
tation. . . .Id. at 566-67.
The rights granted to the juvenile in Kent and most, if not all, of the concerns addressed by the above
criteria have been incorporated into Section 2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30, the statutes governing the waiver
of juvenile jurisdiction in Ohio. See infra notes 13 and 14.
"See Note, supra note 4, at 657.
'2383 U.S. at 557. See supra note 10 for the specific due process rights the Supreme Court outlined for
juvenile transfers in Kent. Other cases expanding the rights of children in juvenile proceedings include
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). In Gault, the Supreme Court held that the fifteenth amendment requires
that in proceedings that may lead to limitations on a juvenile's freedom, the child and his parents must
be notified and told that the minor has a right to counsel. If they are unable to afford counsel, the child
will be represented by a court appointed attorney. The child is also to be protected from self incrimination
and permitted to confront and examine witnesses. See also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), in which
the Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is needed to adjudicate a child a delinquent; Breed
v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), where the Court concluded that the waiver of jurisdiction after an adjudication
of delinquency violates the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment.
RECENT CASESFall, 19821
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss2/8
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
Code Section 2151.26.13 This statute, together with Juvenile Rule 30, 11 outlines
the procedural requirements for the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in Ohio.
The statutory procedures were enacted by the Ohio Legislature as an attempt
to implement the Supreme Court's intention that youthful offenders are not
arbitrarily removed from the juvenile court to be tried and punished as adults.
In Ohio, only the most serious juvenile offenders, defined as children fifteen
years of age or older,I5 charged with felonies' 6 and not reasonably believed to
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (Page 1982). This statute, together with Juv. R. 30, see infra note 14, sets
out the procedural requirements in Ohio for the transfer of minors from the juvenile court to the commonpleas court for the purpose of criminal prosecution. The statute was first enacted in 1969. In 1971, it was
amended to comply with the Kent and Gault mandates. See supra notes 10 and 12 for those specific
requirements. In 1978, the Legislature added subdivision (B) that requires the juvenile court to consider
a finding that the minor had committed the alleged felony against an elderly or disabled person as a factorin favor of transfer of jurisdiction. An additional subdivision, (G), became effective November 23, 1981.See infra note 56 for text of amendment (G). Relevant portions of the text of Section 2151.26 include:(A) After a complaint has been filed alleging that a child is delinquent by reason of having committed
an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the court at a hearing maytransfer the case for criminal prosecution to the appropriate court having jurisdiction of the
offense, after making the following determinations:(1) The child was fifteen or more years of age at the time of the conduct charged;(2) There is probable cause to believe that the child committed the act alleged;(3) After an investigation, including a mental and physical examination of such child .
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that:(a) He is not amenable to care or rehabilitation in any facility designed for the care,
supervision, and rehabilitation of delinquent children;(b) The safety of the community may require that he be placed under legal restraint,
including, if necessary, for the period extending beyond his majority.
(E) No child, either before or after reaching eighteen years of age, shall be prosecuted as an adult
for an offense committed prior to becoming eighteen, unless the child has been transferred
as provided in this section ...(F) Upon such transfer the juvenile court shall state the reasons for the transfer . . . before the
appropriate court for any disposition that the court is authorized to make for a like act committedby an adult. The transfer abates the jurisdiction of the juvenile court with respect to the delinquent
acts alleged in the complaint.
"OHIO R. Juv. P. 30. This rule, together with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26, see supra note 13, sets outthe statutory procedure to be followed by the juvenile court in waiving its jurisdiction over minors. Relevant
portions of this rule include:(A) Preliminary hearing. In any proceeding where the court may transfer a child fifteen or moreyears of age for prosecution as an adult, the court shall hold a preliminary hearing to determine
... probable cause.... Such hearing may be upon motion of the court, the prosecuting attorney
or the child.
(B) Investigation. If the court finds probable cause, it shall continue the proceedings for fullinvestigation. Such investigation shall include a mental and physical examination of the
child .... When the investigation is completed, a hearing shall be held to determine whether
to transfer jurisdiction. Written notice of the time, place and nature of the hearing shall be
given to the parties at least three days prior to the hearing.(C) Prerequisites to transfer. See supra note 13. (Provisions for this section are identical to OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A)(3)(a) and (b).(E) Determination of amenability to rehabilitation. In determining whether the child is amenable
to the treatment or rehabilitative processes available to the juvenile court, the court shall consider:(1) The child's age and his mental and physical health;
(2) The child's prior juvenile record;
(3) Efforts previously made to treat or rehabilitate the child.(4) The child's family environment; and
(5) School record.
(G) Order of transfer. The order of transfer shall state the reasons therefor.
"See supra note 13, for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A)(1).
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A).
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be amenable to rehabilitation,'" may be removed from the juvenile court's
jurisdiction, and only after adherence to the requirements of due process. 8
In other states, there has been a backlash reaction to the Kent mandate
requiring that the juvenile court extend such elaborate due process considerations
to youth offenders. This is especially true concerning those juveniles charged
with committing the more heinous crimes.' Some states and the District of
Columbia have successfully amended their statutes to provide for legislative
and prosecutorial discretion to transfer minors automatically to an adult court
if they commit serious felonies." Since this excludes such children from the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the Kent safeguards do not apply to them.2'
In January, 1982, the Ohio Supreme Court decided State v. Adams, I2 and
its companion case, State v. White.23 The conclusions reached by the Court
in Adams suggest that the decision represents a similar, although less intense,
judicial backlash to the Kent mandates by the Ohio Supreme Court. Although
the Court did not seek to circumvent or tamper with the specific due process
safeguards guaranteed juveniles by Ohio Revised Code Section 2151.264 and
Juvenile Rule 30,25 its opinion implies that in Ohio such protections are to be
permitted to youthful felons only once.
In Adams, the Court held that once a juvenile has been properly transferred
to the common pleas court in any county in Ohio, such a child remains in that
court's jurisdiction for any concurrent and/or subsequent offenses committed
anywhere in Ohio.2 6 Prior to the Adams decision, a child was returned to the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court each time he violated the law, even if previous
cases involving him had been removed to the common pleas court.
State v. Adams concerned the appeals of two male juveniles from their
convictions as adults for a spree of felonies. Terrance Adams and Anthony
White, acting in concert, had perpetrated five armed robberies in two Ohio
counties on November 7 and 8, 1977.
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A)(3)(a).
'See supra note 13 for text of OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26.
"See Note, supra note 4, at 657 nn. 12, 13.
"Id. at 662. The casenote discusses the significance of United States v. Bland, 472 F. 2d 1329 (D.C. Cir,
1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909 (1974). In Bland, the Court of Appeals upheld the D.C. statute which
gave the prosecutor discretion to automatically exclude from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court a child
charged with certain statutorily enumerated offenses. Since the Supreme Court denied the petition for
a writ of certiorari, Bland suggests that a statute excluding the youth charged with certain crimes from
juvenile court or permitting the prosecutor discretion to do so, may be used to deny such youth the due
process protections of Kent.
21Id.
"169 Ohio St. 2d 120, 431 N.E. 2d 326 (1982).
23Id.
2"See supra note 13 for the text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26.
2"See supra note 14 for the text of OHIO R. Juv. P. 30.
2669 Ohio St. 2d at 123-24, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
Fall, 19821 RECENT CASES
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On November 7, the two robbed and assaulted a gas station attendant in
Willoughby before robbing and shooting a victim in a motel parking lot in
Wickliffe. Both of the above crimes were committed within the jurisdiction
of the Lake County Juvenile Court. The next day the pair continued their
rampage, committing three similar robberies in Summit County where they were
arrested. The juveniles were first charged in Summit County Juvenile Court
for the acts committed in that jurisdiction. Hearings were held in accordance
with the provisions of Section 2151.2627 and Juvenile Rule 30.29
The Summit County Juvenile Court decided to transfer the pair and to
try them as adults on the charges filed against them. Thus, on February 28,
1978, each juvenile entered a guilty plea to three counts of aggravated robbery
in common pleas court. Each was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five
to twenty-five years in the Ohio State Reformatory.
Adams and White also faced charges in Lake County. In early January,
1978, however, the authorities there were unaware that the two boys had jointly
committed the two robberies in that county. Therefore, officials originally
charged Adams only with the Willoughby crime and White only with the
Wickliffe offense.
After complying with the required statutory procedures,29 the Lake County
Juvenile Court, like that in Summit County, decided to waive its jurisdic-
tion over the pair and to transfer them to common pleas court. Each juvenile,
however, was bound over to the Lake County Common Pleas Court for only
one of the two aggravated robberies that both had committed.
During the subsequent grand jury proceedings, authorities learned the pair
had acted in concert. Therefore, on November 14, 1978, each defendant was
indicted by the grand jury for both of the robberies. Juvenile court journal
entries concerning the transfers were updated on November 24, 1978, to reflect
the joint involvement of the boys in both crimes.
Adams and White were convicted in Lake County Common Pleas Court
of both aggravated robberies. The defendants appealed, in part, on the ground
that the failure to transfer each juvenile to the adult court on both counts of
aggravated robbery was erroneous and prevented the conviction of each boy
for both crimes.
The Court of Appeals granted the defendants' appeals in regard to the
juvenile court's failure to transfer both juveniles on both counts. That court
reversed White's conviction for the aggravated robbery committed in Willoughby
and reversed Adams's conviction for the aggravated robbery and felonious
"
7See supra note 13.
"See supra note 14.
"See supra notes 13 and 14.
[Vol. 16:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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assault committed in Wickliffe.3" The State of Ohio appealed both reversals
to the Ohio Supreme Court, while the defendants cross appealed on other issues
which the majority chose not to discuss and the dissent considered to be without
merit. 3
The Ohio Supreme Court stated that the central issue for decision was
"whether the defendants were effectively bound over on all the offenses for
which they were ultimately indicted, thus rendering all of their convictions
valid, including the Lake County robbery for which each was never formally
charged in Juvenile Court." 32 The Court concluded that the defendants had
been properly transferred as to all the counts with which they were charged
and thus reversed that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals.33
Rather than immediately moving into a discussion of the rationale under-
lying its central holding, the majority opinion, written by Justice Krupansky,
turned its attention to the hearing on the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
held in Summit County. The court stated that since the defendants never ques-
tioned the relinquishment of jurisdiction by the Summit County Juvenile Court,
the decision that the boys would not be responsive to treatment within the
juvenile justice system was res judicata in any adult court in Ohio.3"
The court cited Whitehead v. General Telephone Co. of Ohio" as authority
for the res judicata proposition without any discussion of that precedent. The
court stated that the interest of "judicial economy" made it unnecessary for
another county to make the same transfer decision for "the same juveniles for
like or similar crimes committed within a reasonably short period of time;
especially since the defendants were incarcerated for three counts of aggravated
robbery at the Ohio State Reformatory pending the proceedings in Lake
County." 36
Although the majority appeared to pronounce a relatively narrow rule,
the court, in fact, went on to state a proposition limited only by its reference
to felonies. The general rule laid down in Adams is that once a child is properly
transferred from the juvenile court to the common pleas court in any county
in Ohio under the provisions of Section 2151.26 and Juvenile Rule 30, that
transfer is permanent. As a result, the child remains in the jurisdiction of the
adult court for any concurrent felonies committed in the transferring county
and in other counties in the state as well. This transfer also applies to any future
felonies that the child may commit.37 The majority's central rationale for this
3069 Ohio St. 2d at 122, 431 N.E. 2d at 328.
"Id. at 132, 431 N.E. 2d at 334.
"Id. at 123, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
"Id. at 123-24, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
34Id.
"20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E. 2d 10 (1969).
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 124, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
"Id. at 127, 431 N.E. 2d at 331.
RECENT CASESFall, 19821
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decision was that once the determination has been made that it is not reasonable
to believe the child can be rehabilitated in juvenile facilities, it is senseless to
relitigate the question when the child commits future felonies.38
After enunciating the res judicata doctrine, however, the Court went on
to recognize that the juvenile courts of both Summit and Lake Counties had
complied with proper statutory procedures for transferring jurisdiction over
the defendants in their respective counties." As a result, the Lake County
Common Pleas Court and Grand Jury obtained jurisdiction over the defen-
dants without any need to rely on the doctrine of res judicata. Therefore, the
central issue before the Court was not whether the authority of the Lake County
Grand Jury and Common Pleas Court arose automatically from the initial
transfer in Summit County."0
Justice Sweeney, joined in dissent by Justice William Brown, questioned
the majority's "new found res judicata theory."4 ' Justice Sweeney felt that the
theory was contrary to his interpretation of the intent of Section 2151.26. Justice
Sweeney maintained that the case, and not the child was transferred, and he
pointed to the language in subdivision (A), (E), and (F) 2 of the statute to support
his position.
The dissent also argued that the statute required a case-by-case decision
thereby retaining the juvenile justice system's historical flexibility to re-evaluate
the child in different contexts. A permanent waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction
would totally remove such flexibility from the system.
The dissent posed a hypothetical fact situation to highlight the lack of flex-
ibility inherent in the res judicata theory. 3 Justice Sweeney noted that the theory
failed to consider the plight of a juvenile bound over to the adult court, found
innocent of the charges upon which he was transferred, yet permanently placed
in the jurisdiction of the adult court. The dissent found no intent in Section
2151.26 to have the juvenile court waive jurisdiction permanently to condone
such a situation,
In essence, Justice Sweeney argued that the majority, in the name of
"judicial economy," was willing to ignore the statutory procedural protections
for minors established by the General Assembly. The dissent also questioned
the majority's reliance upon Whitehead" as precedent for its res judicata theory
in regard to juvenile transfers. Whitehead, the dissent noted, was a civil action
3"Id.
"Id. at 124, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
"Id. at 127, 431 N.E. 2d at 331.
"Id. at 130, 431 N.E. 2d at 333.
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A), (E), (F).
4'69 Ohio St. 2d at 130, 431 N.E. 2d at 333.
"20 Ohio St. 2d 108, 254 N.E. 2d 10 (1969).
[Vol. 16:2
7
Johnson: State v. Adams
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
that dealt with the derivative claim of the parents of an injured child, not the
rights of a juvenile offender.
After propounding its res judicata theory, the court returned to the central
issue assigned as error by the defendants. The defendants maintained that the
Lake County Grand Jury lacked authority to indict the defendants on charges
arising during its proceedings and not originally filed in juvenile court. The
Court rejected the defendants' contention as "patently illogical" under State
v. Klingenberger."5 In that case, the court had held that "grand juries have
plenary and inquisitorial powers and may lawfully upon their own motion
originate charges against offenders."" The majority thus affirmed Klingenberger
in concluding that the Lake County Grand Jury's "plenary power" included
the authority "to return any indictment which conformed to the facts submitted
in evidence": that both defendants committed both robberies in that county. 7
The majority also found no merit in the defendants' contention that
Klingenberger was irrelevant to the instant case because it was decided under
Ohio General Code Section 1681 rather than its successor, the present applicable
law, Section 2151.26. The Court cited Klingenberger as dispositive on the
rationale that Ohio General Code Section 1681 differed from Section 2151.26
only in its wording, not in its purpose of transferring the child charged with
a felony to the common pleas court. 8
The dissent, in turn, rejected the majority's effort to reinvigorate
Klingenberger. Justice Sweeney distinguished the precedent from the instant
case on both facts and the law. Klingenberger, he pointed out, concerned a
single criminal offense that gave rise to one charge in juvenile court and a dif-
ferent charge in common pleas court. The instant case involved a series of
offenses in two counties. Additionally, the dissent argued that Klingenberger
was inapplicable because it predated Kent v. United States"9 and Section
2151. 26 .1o As noted earlier, the Ohio legislature responded to the Kent man-
dates by enacting Section 2151.26 to succeed General Code Section 1681.1
Justice Sweeney emphasized that the procedural requirements outlined in Kent
were significantly more stringent than those required by General Code Section
1681, the statute under which Klingenberger was decided. 2
"113 Ohio St. 418, 149 N.E. 395 (1925).
"id. at 425, 149 N.E. at 397.
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 125, 431 N.E. 2d at 330.
"Id.
4"383 U.S. 541 (1966). See supra note 10 for the specific due process rights assured the juvenile in Kent.
"See supra note 13 for history and text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26.
"Cf. supra note 10, the specific due process rights granted the juvenile in Kent, with supra note 13, the
provisions of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26.
5269 Ohio St. 2d at 125 n.l, 431 N.E. 2d at 330 n.1. GEN. CODE § 1681 read:
When any information or complaint shall be filed against a delinquent child under these provisions,
charging him with a felony, the judge may order such a child to enter into a recognizance, with
good and sufficient surety, in such amount as he deems reasonable, for his appearance before the
Fall, 1982] RECENT CASES
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The majority, however, did not rely solely on the precedent of Klingenberger
to reject the defendants' contention that the grand jury lacked jurisdiction as
to the charges arising during its proceedings and not originally filed in juvenile
court. The court used its analysis of the intent of Section 2151.26 and Juvenile
Rule 30 as the second leg of its rationale. The court had earlier justified the
res judicata procedure it espoused as one intended by those statutes.
The majority pointed to language in Section 2151.26 (E)53 and Juvenile
Rule 301 as intending the transfer of the child and not the transfer of a particular
case or cause of action. The court agreed with the defendants that Section
2151.26 (F)" states that the transfer of the juvenile to common pleas court ends
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in regard to the offenses alleged in the
complaint. However, the majority rejected the defendants' contention that the
implication of subdivision (F) is, therefore, that the juvenile court regains
jurisdiction over future felonies the juvenile commits as a minor.
The majority made mention in a footnote,5 6 that Section 2151.26 had been
amended effective November 23, 1981, to include a new subdivision, (G). That
amendment states that a juvenile transferred pursuant to the statute and con-
victed shall thereafter be prosecuted as an adult if he commits certain specified
felonies in the future. Although the court noted that this new subdivision was
not applicable law at the time of the transfers in the instant case, the majority
pointed to it as evidence that even the latest legislative mandate did not intend
the juvenile court to regain jurisdiction over a transferred child for future
offenses.
The dissent, on the other hand, argued that the intent of the statutes was
the transfer of the cases not the child. The dissent's analysis of Section 2151.26
relied upon the language of subdivisions (A), (E), and (F). 7 The dissent had
earlier used this interpretation of the intent of the statute as grounds for rejecting
the majority's res judicata doctrine.58 Justice Sweeney also found the court's
reference to subdivision (G), the 1981 amendment to Section 2151.26, detracted
from the majority's holding that the statute intended a permanent transfer.
Justice Sweeney suggested that the fact that the legislature specifically added
court of common pleas at the next term thereof ...
Cf. the lack of due process requirements in GEN. CODE § 1681 with those mandated in Kent, seesupra note
10; in Gault, see supra note 12; in OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26, see supra note 13.
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (E).
"See supra note 14 for text of OHIO R. Juv. P. 30. See esp. subdivision (A) which speaks of the transfer
of the child.
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (F).
669 Ohio St. 2d at 126 n.3, 431 N.E. 2d at 331 n.3. The Court quoted OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (G).
Any child whose case is transferred for criminal prosecution pursuant to this section and who
is subsequently convicted in that case shall thereafter be prosecuted as an adult in the appropriate
court for any future act he is alleged to have committed ... the offense of murder or aggravated
murder, or [any act that] would constitute a felony of the first or second degree.
"See supra note 13 for text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26 (A), (E), (F).
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 128, 431 N.E. 2d at 332. See supra pp. 9-10 of this Note.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
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subdivision (G) implied that the permanence of prior juvenile transfers was not
initially settled under the law.
Moreover, the dissent pointed out that the majority's holding on the per-
manence of the transfer is not consistent with Section 2151.26 (G). In essence,
Justice Sweeney argued that the court had rewritten the new subdivision and
applied it prior to its effective date.59
There is not question that the dissent correctly concluded that the judicial
rule of Adams and the legislature rule of Section 2151.26 (G) are not consis-
tent. The court in Adams held that the mere waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile
court is sufficient to complete a permanent transfer of the child to the adult
court. Yet, the rule may be no more than dicta.
6 Section 2151.26 (G), on the
other hand, requires not only a transfer of the child but also his conviction
in common pleas court in addition to his committing specified felonies in the
future in order to make the waiver irreversible. The new statutory amendment
reflects a legislative intent to permanently deprive the child of the protective
shield of the juvenile court only if he continues to commit serious felonies after
conviction. Section 2151.26 (G) therefore, applies in a much narrower context
than Adams as the dissent pointed out. The Adams decision, in contrast, reflects
a judicial intent to sever irreversibly the minor felon's juvenile status earlier
in time and to punish him as an adult thereafter.
How the court will reconcile the inconsistency between the judicial and
statutory rules in deciding future juvenile transfer cases is presently unclear.
The true significance of the Adams decision, therefore, may have to await further
judicial interpretation. Which rule might prevail and when? The Adams rule
would very likely control the future felonies of any juvenile transferred prior
to November 23, 198 1, the date upon which Section 2151.26 (G) became effec-
tive law. However, the future felonies of a juvenile transferred on or after that
date would seemed to be controlled by the statute.
In Adams the Court held that a juvenile properly bound over in any county
in Ohio is considered transferred for any pending felonies in other counties
as well. How Section 2151.26 (G) will affect this portion of the Adams rule
is also unclear. Subdivision (G) speaks to future acts, not pending felonies.
Therefore, the court might limit the amendment's requirement that the juvenile
be convicted before the transfer is permanent to future felonies only. The court
might still consider a transfer that did not result in conviction as permanent
for any pending felonies in other counties. Likewise, the court might find the
central holding of Adams regarding the plenary powers of a grand jury to indict
the juvenile on any charges called for by the evidence to be unaffected by sub-
division (G).
The above mentioned discrepancies between the Adams decision and Section
"Id. at 131, 431 N.E. 2d at 333-34.
"See supra p. 9 of this Note.
10
Akron Law Review, Vol. 16 [1983], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol16/iss2/8
2151.26 (G) suggest certain explanations as to why the court decided the case
as it did. First, the decision reached by the court suggests, if not a judicial
backlash against the Kent mandates, at least a judicial crackdown on juveniles
fifteen years of age or older charged with felonies. With the Adams decision,
the court has signaled its intent to sever such children permanently from the
rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court system the first time that the court
finds it reasonable to believe that they are not amenable to the care its facilities
can provide.
Second, the court shows no intention of circumventing or tampering with
the due process safeguards which such children are entitled to before being
transferred to common pleas court under exiting statutes. However, such children
would appear to be entitled to such considerations only once.
Third, the Adams decision implies a judicial belief that the legislature erred
in enacting Section 2151.26 (G) which permits older juvenile felons to remain
under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court unless charged with specified felonies
after an initial felony conviction. The opinion suggests a judicial belief that
the legislature is thus allowing such serious young offenders to remain too long
under the protective shield of the juvenile court. Therefore, by holding that
the initial transfer of such children is permanent in regard to concurrent and
pending felonies anywhere in Ohio, the court could significantly undercut the
effectiveness of Section 2151.26 (G) in authorizing only the permanent transfer
of repeat juvenile felons.
Moreover, the court's position that a minor's failure to question the juvenile
court transfer makes the matter res judicata in any adult court in Ohio6' deserves
closer scrutiny in light of other existing Ohio law. Adams requires that a juvenile
give greater consideration to appealing a waiver decision than the court would
permit to strip him permanently of his rights under the juvenile justice system.
For example, under Adams, a minor not convicted of the charges on which
he was transferred in one county will still remain in the jurisdiction of the
common pleas court in that county and in any other county for any pending
offenses because of the initial transfer. Yet, the juvenile's efforts to immediately
appeal the initial waiver of juvenile court authority will prove futile. Ohio is
among a minority of states that permit no direct appeal from a waiver order.6"
Therefore, a juvenile's first opportunity to challenge the decision that he
"69 Ohio St. 2d at 123-24, 431 N.E. 2d at 329.
"
2 In re Becker, 39 Ohio St. 2d 84, 314 N.E. 2d 158 (1974). In Becker, the Court held that a transfer order
was not a final appealable order on the grounds that such an appeal would be an unnecessary delay in
reaching the ultimate decision of the child's innocence or guilt of the offense charged. Thus the Courtplaced a priority upon the determination of guilt or innocence and not upon the child's loss of significant
rights and protections statutorily available to him only in the juvenile court. The majority view, permittingthe direct appeal of waiver orders, places the emphasis upon the loss of the child's rights. But see infra
note 64, at 53, for the view that the Ohio position that the waiver order is not a final appealable order
may be a majority view.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:2
11
Johnson: State v. Adams
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1983
would not be responsive to treatment in any facility in the juvenile system will
not occur until he files a motion to dismiss the charges in common pleas court.
If the motion is overruled, the minor must defend himself in a criminal trial
against the charges upon which he was transferred as well as any charges added
by the grand jury.
Assuming a conviction, he must appeal both the conviction and the initial
waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction. The child's position in regard to his
amenability to rehabilitation in juvenile facilities may be irreparably weakened
after a conviction has been handed down in a criminal court. Thus, the alterna-
tives available to a minor attempting to appeal his transfer have been called
"hollow remedies."
6 3
The finality of the waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction over any minor
under Adams suggests an even greater need to modify Ohio law to permit a
direct appeal of such a decision. The Institute of Judicial Administration of
the American Bar Association supports such a juvenile justice standard.6 " Addi-
tionally, the model standards of the Institute recommend that the jurisdiction
of the criminal court should not begin until the time for filing an appeal has
passed or until the final decision of the appellate court has been handed down. 5
The primary purpose of an immediate appeal is to have another judicial
body consider, before the effects of the decision are compounded, whether the
juvenile court decision to transfer a minor was arbitrary or mistaken. How much
likelihood is there that a waiver decision made by a juvenile judge will be arbitrary
or mistaken? A 1969 Ohio study,' 6 conducted prior to the legislature's updating
of Section 2151.2667 to meet the mandates of Kent"5 and In re Gault, 9 revealed
that whether a child was treated as a juvenile or as an adult was determined
primarily by the judge before whom the juvenile appeared. Of the forty-eight
judges responding, thirty-one transferred from zero to three percent of the
children appearing before them who had allegedly committed felonies; twelve
judges transferred between five and fifty percent; and five judges transferred
over fifty percent of such children."
"Comment, supra note 6, at 518.
By not providing direct appeal from orders of waiver, Ohio has, in a sense, left the door open
to the possibility that a decision on waiver which is arbitrary or even due to mistake, will not be
corrected until the juvenile has been exposed to the criminal system.
"INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS § 2.4 (1980).
APPEAL: (A) The juvenile or prosecuting attorney may file an appeal of the waiver decision with
the court authorized to hear appeals from final judgments of the juvenile court within [seven] court
days of the decision of the juvenile court. Id.
"Id. at § 2.4C.
"Comment, supra note 6, at 136.
"See supra note 13 for enactment and amendment dates relating to OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26, as
well as for the text of the statute.
6383 U.S. 541 (1966). See supra note 10 for Kent mandates.
"387 U.S. 1 (1967). See supra note 12 for Gault mandates.
"Comment, supra note 6, at 136.
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A more recent 1974 study ' tellingly reveals the discrepant manner in which
some juvenile judges in California exercised their discretion with regard to waiver.
Of the 660 juvenile cases transferred to the adult courts in California that year,
juvenile judges in Los Angeles accounted for nineteen cases, less than three
percent of the total. Juvenile judges in San Diego, a city less than a quarter
the size of Los Angeles, on the other hand, transferred 288 cases, over forty-
three percent of the total.12
Statistics such as the above lend continuing support to the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Kent that arbitrary judicial discretion must be replaced by due
process guarantees in juvenile transfers. Therefore, judicial acts, such as the
Adams decision, that permit juvenile transfers to become permanent
automatically, may be viewed as a return to a form of arbitrary judicial discre-
tion that existed prior to Kent.
Such attempts to irreversibly sever Ohio's most troubled youth from the
one institution designed to assist them, the juvenile court, implies a sense of
hopelessness regarding the ability of such children to change for the better. As
a result, punishment becomes the ultimate solution.
The need to modify Ohio law to permit children to directly appeal their
transfer from juvenile court and its accompanying loss of rights and immunities
has become imperative in light of the Adams decision. The direct appeal would
permit a branch of the judiciary outside the juvenile system a second chance
to consider whether prison, punishment, and exposure to hardened adult
criminals is the only remaining way to deal with juvenile felons. A more humane
and constructive long-range solution might emerge from the direct appeal of
juvenile court waiver decisions. At the least, the court of appeals would escape
the potential prejudice of having to reconsider the transfer decision after the
criminal court had already found the child guilty and convicted him.
ANTONIA K. JOHNSON
7
'Gasper & Katkins, supra note 3, at 939 & n. I1. This article cites CALIF. DEP'T. OF JUSTIc'E, DIVISION
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